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Abstract 
In recent years, William E. Connolly has argued that the phenomenon of complexity in 
the physical sciences carries radical implications for political theory: namely, that 
political theorists should now be revising their concepts of agency, responsibility, and 
freedom. This very recent project of Connolly’s has not (yet) attracted much opposition. 
Here I offer a critique of Connolly’s argument which focuses on three key areas: (1) 
how he interprets and deploys “evidence” from physical science; (2) his theory of 
“creative freedom”; and (3) the impact that his recent philosophy has on the idea of the 
intellect. I argue that Connolly’s scientific evidence is not what he claims it is; that the 
theory of “creative freedom” he offers fails; and that his critique of the intellect fails in 
theory, and would be highly damaging in practice. 
“The universe is change: life is judgement.” 
— Marcus Aurelius, Meditations IV, 3:4 
 
Connolly’s “world of becoming” thesis 
William E. Connolly’s work is well known among political theorists, and much of it – 
including titles such as The Terms of Political Discourse (1974),1 Politics and 
Ambiguity (1987),2 and Political Theory and Modernity (1988)3 – is very highly 
regarded. In 2009 Matthew J. Moore conducted a survey of over a thousand political 
theorists in the USA, asking them which figures they thought had had the greatest 
impact on the political theory of the last twenty years. Connolly came fourth, behind 
John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault.4 
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But Connolly’s recent work is very different from that which established his 
reputation in earlier decades. His change of direction, his “turn to affect,”5 is discernible 
from Why I Am Not a Secularist (1999) and Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed 
(2002)6 forward. Since then Connolly has been developing what is known as his “deep 
pluralism.”7 For Connolly, conventional pluralism is confined by an “unconscious 
conservatism” in the way it presupposes “the normal individual.”8 But deep pluralism 
                                                                                                                                               
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463648, p. 8. 
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Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition., eds David Campbell and Morton 
Schoolman (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 62–84; p. 77. 
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understands individuals and/or identities as inherently ambiguous and contested as well 
– unstable, volatile, “fragile,” existing always in a state of “becoming,” affected, 
comprising the meeting of various elements, “forces,” or “energies.”9 Such description, 
Connolly argues, applies not only to individual persons and groups of people, but also to 
their thoughts, decisions, and to all the objects and systems with which they interact.10 
The scale of Connolly’s “world of becoming” thesis, then, is sufficiently universal that 
he can call it an “ontocosmology,”11 and he presents it as a new alternative to what he 
takes to be the two approaches to the universe dominant hitherto: the first being that the 
universe is “mechanistic” (and therefore that the future is “contained in the present”12), 
and the other that the universe is governed by God.13 
Connolly’s recent work is also marked by scattered discussions of what he offers 
as “evidence”14 for the world of becoming: namely, certain discoveries in physical 
science on every scale – geology, oceanography, and (importantly) biology and 
neuroscience15 – particularly those discoveries pertaining to “complexity theory.” 
                                                 
9 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis, London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 57; Connolly, World, p. 127; William E. 
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Connolly explains that scientists have lately been discovering that the complex systems 
(i.e. those with many interacting components) studied in various fields can (1) produce 
novel phenomena that could not have been predicted in advance, and (2) self-organize.16 
These processes happen, Connolly explains, without the involvement of any sort of 
intelligence. But nevertheless such systems are “creative,”17 in the sense of Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution: their complex structures, whether comprising human or nonhuman 
forces, or both,18 produce novel phenomena by way of a “mysterious”19 process in 
which the various forces comprising the system meet and interact in a way that is 
(Connolly says) clearly not reducible to some mechanism which can be known and used 
by humans to make predictions: “For in a world of becoming,” he writes, “the new 
periodically comes into being in ways that defeat attempts to generalize from past 
regularities to a reliable future.”20 This mysterious process is called “emergence,” or 
“emergent causality.”21 Furthermore, the emergent phenomena of one complex system 
often trigger new responses in another/others; so such systems are not only not 
mechanical, they are also “open” rather than “closed” to other systems.22 In view of 
                                                 
16 For examples see World, pp. 15, 18, 77–78; and Fragility, pp. 33–34, 81–
97. 
17 Neuropolitics, p. 1; Fragility, p. 156. 
18 Fragility, p. 35. 
19 World, p. 80; see also p. 38. 
20 World, p. 35. 
21 World, p. 44. 
22 World, p. 7; see also pp. 9, 12, 17–19, 20, 27, 30, 37–39, 43, 83, 136–137, 
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such discoveries in science, Connolly urges political theorists to draw “into close 
communication a philosophy of becoming.”23 
 
The politics of complexity 
But “herein resides the problem,” Connolly says: “Those thinkers most attuned to a 
cosmos of becoming…” – and he names Stuart Kauffman, Ilya Prigogine, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and Gilles Deleuze among others24 – “have been rather inactive in bringing 
these insights to the ecology of late capitalism.”25 It is Connolly’s intention to address 
this shortcoming, to bring out, in other words, the impact that affect and becoming, as a 
world-view now increasingly “evidenced” by the discovery of complexity and emergent 
phenomena in physical science, should have on political theory and political 
practice/activism.26 
The impact Connolly presents is fundamental and far-reaching: it concerns 
“traditional” (or “classical,”27 or “received”28) models of human (1) knowledge and (2) 
agency that are based on reliable prediction, intellectual understanding, and rational 
                                                 
23 Fragility, p. 29. 
24 World, p. 37. 
25 Fragility, p. 30. 
26 For a good discussion of Connolly’s position on the relation between theory 
and practice, see Morton Schoolman, “A Pluralist Mind: Agonistic Respect and the 
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27 World, p. 7. 
28 World, p. 17. 
deliberation. For Connolly, these traditional models are to be associated with the old 
and ostensibly discredited idea that we humans are or should be in some way separate 
from the complex processes going on around us, and possessed of the capacity to 
predict and control (or “master”29) them. Connolly identifies what he calls “the 
anthropic exception”30 to the worldview he endorses with the assumption that the 
investigator “has special standing … above or outside the regularities governing 
nature,”31 and this assumption he identifies with a wide range of targets: “analytic 
philosophers, rational choice theorists, deliberative democrats and ‘intellectualists’ of 
various sorts,”32 “devotees of transcendence,”33 and with Augustine and Kant.34 In 
Connolly’s view, all of these are overturned by the new “world of becoming” thesis. 
Now this project of “problematizing”35 the autonomous agency, will, and 
responsibility of the individual has been a consistent feature of Connolly’s work since 
long before he began to discuss physical science in such detail.36 Mark Redhead has 
also recognized that these metaphysical positions have in fact “been embedded within 
                                                 
29 World, p. 10. 
30 World, pp. 21, 25, 148. 
31 World, p. 148. 
32 World, pp. 47–48. 
33 World, p. 64. 
34 World, pp. 148–150; Fragility, p. 135. 
35 World, p. 29. 
36 See William E. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of 
Political Paradox (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 111–114; see 
also pp. 95–122; and Ethos, pp. xxiv–xxx. 
Connolly’s work since its early days.”37 But it is only recently that Connolly has begun 
to claim that such revisions as he has been recommending would bring the human 
sciences into line with the physical sciences.38 For Connolly, the erroneous “traditional” 
models of human agency and deliberation according to which (he thinks) most political 
theory operates, have contributed to “vengeful cultural orientations to crime and 
punishment” (he is thinking especially of capital punishment39), “stingy conceptions of 
distributive justice,” “narrow definitions of self-interest,” “dismissive stories about 
those who are down and out,” “severe accusations against those outside your country, 
class, ethnicity, faith, or sexuality,” and “refusals to acknowledge and address the 
fragility of things”40; “practices of capitalist greed, religious exclusivity, media 
bellicosity, authoritarian strategies, sexual narrowness, and military aggression.”41 The 
exact process by which traditional models of human agency and thinking have 
generated these things is never entirely clear; Connolly is mostly content with the 
explanation that such ideas “resonate” or “reverberate” with other “resentments.”42 But 
                                                 
37 Mark Redhead, Reasoning With Who We Are: Democratic Theory For a 
Not So Liberal Era (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 280. 
38 World, p. 168. 
39 See Secularist, p. 133–136. 
40 Fragility, pp. 179–180; World, pp. 139–140; Secularist, p. 55. See also 
William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 63. 
41 World, p. 66. 
42 Capitalism, p. 44; see also pp. 51–4; and World, pp. 12, 13, 61; and 
Fragility, pp. 18, 28, 39, 125, 127, 133, 138–139, 147, 170–180, 204n4. “Resentment” 
Connolly is clear that to improve our engagement with the world (i.e. both knowing it 
and acting in it) we must abandon those traditional models that deny the world of 
becoming, and instead affirm becoming by seeing individuals as parts of complex, 
creative, open systems that (1) go far beyond individuals and (2) penetrate deep within 
them. This, he thinks, will open us up to what our politics really needs. 
Although Connolly does outline some specific practical policies, mostly he 
avoids specific political prescriptions, and prefers to discuss the emergence of a global 
network of counter-movements, which he calls “a political resonance machine.”43 This 
movement will be “composed of multiple constituencies,”44 it will be based on “timely 
militancy”45 and “experimental micropolitics”46 (especially “role experimentation”47), 
and it will infuse “a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life”48 – an ethos of “visceral 
attachment” to life and the world,49 and of cultivating generosity and gratitude for 
                                                                                                                                               
and “affirmation” feature heavily in Connolly’s recent work. Connolly means the 
resentment one might feel when the world is discovered or claimed to be different from 
what one might have wanted (see World, p. 112). He very often describes, for example, 
the resentment of a “non-providential” world (Capitalism, pp. 41, 58), and of time 
(Capitalism, p. 57; World, pp. 106, 119–120). 
43 World, pp. 41, 135–147. 
44 World, pp. 41, 135–147. 
45 Fragility, pp. 136–137. 
46 Fragility, p. 38; see also p. 182. 
47 Fragility, pp. 179–195; see also World, pp. 143–144. 
48 Fragility, p. 40; see particularly pp. 130–137; and World, p. 41. 
49 World, p. 57. 
being50 through working “tactically upon yourself.”51 
But although Connolly’s ideas for political engagement are intended to be of use 
to activists, the major implications of affirming the world of becoming that he discusses 
are on the level of theory. Because two of these in particular are the subject of the 
present critique, I will deal with his arguments concerning them in special detail. 
 
The redistribution of agency 
In Connolly’s view, political theory today must revise its “widely received ideas about 
the meaning and distribution of agency.”52 “Agency,” in the sense of some capacity for 
individual autonomy, has traditionally been understood to underpin the notion that 
individuals are individually responsible for what they say and do,53 at least sometimes. 
The fundamental principle of “deep pluralism” however is that the individual itself 
should be pluralized, and for Connolly this represents a radical break from the 
traditional notion of individual agency. Towards this conclusion Connolly argues two 
points: 
First, non-human forces should be considered to have more agency than 
previously thought. The neuroanthropologist Stuart Kauffman, Connolly explains, 
                                                 
50 Neuropolitics, p. 106; World, p. 41. 
51 World, p. 26; see also p. 57. 
52 World, p. 12, emphasis added. The witness Connolly calls most often in 
connection with this necessity is Stuart A. Kauffman: see World, pp. 12, 20–21, 23–24, 
26, 28–31, 37, 165, 173; and Fragility, pp. 29–30, 83, 161, 163, 218n8, 221, 222n22. 
53 See World, p. 22. 
identifies “processes in lower organisms that bear family resemblances to human 
agency” and “says that ‘the agency that arises with life brings values, meaning and 
action into the universe,’ and stresses that ‘agency reaches beyond humans.’”54 One 
such “family resemblance” is the agent’s appearing to want and/or pursue things, such 
as the bacterium, which “is attracted to sugar; it pursues it as an end; it adjusts its 
behaviour to pursue its end; and it feels satisfaction when it achieves the end intended.” 
So even the bacterium “possesses some characteristics of agency so defined.”55  
Another of Connolly’s examples of non-human agency is alcoholism, which, “once its 
drive to satisfaction is installed in brain synapses, acts as a micro-agent.”56 There are 
“different degrees of agency in other force-fields with which we interact,”57 Connolly 
argues, especially in other self-organizing systems,58 which interfere with our brain 
chemistry, affect our thinking, and influence our actions. Verbs of this sort – 
“interfering,” “affecting,” “influencing” – are the essence of Connolly’s definition of 
agency; so he concludes that non-human forces that perform such functions outside and 
within an individual are actually part of the “structure” of a person’s agency.59 
Second, and following on from this, Connolly argues that although humans do 
indeed have agency (because they affect things), and although their agency “involves 
                                                 
54 World, p. 24. 
55 World, p. 24; see also C. R. Hayward, “Ethics, Politics, and the Limits of 
Reason,” Political Theory 43: 2 (April 2012), 237–245; 240. 
56 World, p. 27; see also Secularist, p. 3. 
57 World, p. 7. 
58 World, pp. 21, 23, 24. 
59 Secularist, pp. 120, 174. 
much more than proto-agency,”60 they should nevertheless be considered to have less 
agency than traditionally assumed. Human agency is “limited” by all the other things 
that affect human thought and action61: we are affected by microbes and hormones 
inside us, such as testosterone, adrenaline, cortisol, and dopamine, which “are what Jane 
Bennett and Bruno Latour would call ‘actants,’ microforces with variations and powers 
that flow into the brain’s higher decision-making areas to help accelerate, decelerate, 
intensify, or dampen complex decisions.”62 There are also external forces affecting us: 
“sunlight, electrical shocks, insulting statements, magnetic fields, a raging sea, 
inspirational actions, and so on.”63 For Connolly these “actants,” small or large, internal 
or external, affect reasoning itself – and on both sides of the “classical”64 distinction 
between theoretical reason (“making up your mind that”) and practical reason (“making 
up your mind to”).65 It follows, Connolly says, that individuals are so affected that there 
is in fact never a central decision-making “I” to be blamed for a thought or action; 
innumerable non-human elements within the complex process are what are really 
“decisive.” No single one of these forces is the primary decision-maker; complex 
processes within (and without) agents generate phenomena emergently.66 So as 
                                                 
60 World, p. 25. 
61 World, p. 25; see also pp. 15, 25, 27, 32, 82; and Fragility, p. 128. 
62 Fragility, pp. 84–85, emphasis added; see also Neuropolitics, pp. 1–21. 
63 World, p. 150; see also Neuropolitics, p. 75. 
64 World, p. 23. 
65 See R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan: or Man, Civilization and 
Barbarism [1942] (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 100. 
66 Fragility, p. 34. 
individuals we are not “consummate agents,”67 Connolly argues; each of us is “a 
complex assemblage of heterogeneous elements bound loosely together”68; although we 
indeed have intentions and consciousness, these are “the end point of activity already 
underway.”69 Agency is an emergent phenomenon70; “Its agency and our agency 
become blended together”71; thoughts themselves are emergent phenomena.72 And what 
we have been calling the “will” is in fact “an emergent, biocultural formation.”73 “The 
“you”,” Connolly writes, addressing his reader, “refers to intra-individual, micro- and 
macro-assemblages of desire.”74 
For Connolly, then, the individual person is a multiplicity, as Deleuze said it 
should be; today there is scientific “evidence” proving that each of us is composed of 
multiple “micro-agents.”75 And it follows, Connolly concludes, that political theorists 
must cultivate a more “distributive image” of agency76 in which actions and behaviours 
are attributed no longer (entirely) to the traditional “I,” but to an assemblage of actants. 
Given the fact that actants are within and without us, this “redistribution” of agency 
                                                 
67 World, p. 7. 
68 World, p. 27. 
69 World, p. 25. 
70 World, p. 23. 
71 World, p. 64. 
72 World, pp. 76, 78. 
73 World, p. 82; see also pp. 27, 64; and Fragility, pp. 127–130. 
74 World, p. 123. 
75 World, p. 27. 
76 World, pp. 21–22, emphasis added. 
should be both downwards, to natural microprocesses, and upwards, to processes on a 
larger scale.77 The answer that Connolly thinks this gives to the manifestations of the 
traditional models of thought and action outlined above – “vengeful cultural orientations 
to crime and punishment,” “stingy conceptions of distributive justice,” “dismissive 
stories about those who are down and out,” etc. – is that individual responsibility is now 
discovered, ostensibly by science, to be incalculably mitigated. Our “notions of 
masterful agency” are, Connolly says, “compromised,”78 and the “hubris” of the 
“anthropic exception” is curtailed.79 
 
Critique 
Connolly’s problematization of individual agency and reason in political theory has not 
yet attracted much attention among his readers, let alone opposition from them.80  The 
essays collected by Alan Finlayson in Democracy and Pluralism: The Political Thought 
of William E. Connolly (2010),81 and those collected by Campbell and Schoolman in 
The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition (2008), 
                                                 
77 World, p. 22. 
78 Fragility, p. 14. 
79 World, p. 25. 
80 See however Hayward, “Ethics.” Ruth Leys’ critique (“The Turn to 
Affect”) is aimed chiefly at Brian Massumi, though Connolly is also discussed (459–
463). 
81 Alan Finlayson, Democracy and Pluralism: The Political Thought of 
William E. Connolly (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
focus on his contributions to more conventional debates in political theory: pluralism in 
the more conventional sense, rights, democracy, violence, difference, etc. That his 
arguments are going unopposed is especially true of his deployment of science to 
support the problematization of agency and reason – partly, I assume, because that 
“turn” is only very recent. Mark Redhead, whose Reasoning With Who We Are was 
recently discussed in The Review of Politics, does mention Connolly’s interest in 
complexity science,82 but his discussion is not detailed, and complexity science does 
not feature at all in his “Lessons learned from Connolly.”83 
There are however good reasons to pay attention to this aspect of Connolly’s 
recent work, but to greet it with substantial reservations. First, Connolly’s use of 
science to support his political arguments does not provide the “evidence” that he 
claims it does.84 Second, the theory of freedom he proposes, and claims to be 
consequent upon the rethinking of agency, appears on closer inspection to fail. And 
finally the impact of Connolly’s philosophy on the standing of those functions of mind 
commonly called “intellectual” is deleterious, with probable exacerbating effects on the 
very environmental politics that are of increasing importance to his work. I have taken 
these three criticisms in this order below. 
But before I detail these reservations, I should explain how I understand the 
historical background of the following critique. Connolly presents his work in this area 
as something very new, in view of both the apparently cutting-edge science upon which 
it is based and the radical, “experimental” political implications that follow from it. His 
                                                 
82 See Reasoning, p. 292. 
83 Reasoning, pp. 310–312. 
84 See World, pp. 6, 39, 40, 68; and Fragility, pp. 29, 85. 
recent work addresses “a new pluralist assemblage,” frequently promising “new 
directions,” new “possibilities,” “new pressures,” new “experiments,” “new 
experiences,” “new and surprising events,” “new sensitivities,” new “unions” or 
“arrangements,” new “ways to belong to time,” etc.85 What is especially new, he thinks, 
is the cross-fertilization of these two areas of interest, complexity science and political 
theory/activism, to bear the fruit of one comprehensive world-view uniting processes of 
becoming from the microbial level to the macropolitical and beyond.86 
Actually many of the arguments and tropes Connolly is now deploying have 
already been targeted in two large critical works of the 1920s by the British author and 
painter, Wyndham Lewis (1882–1957), many of whose targets are figures cited by 
Connolly as particularly inspiring: above all, Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, A. N. 
Whitehead, and William James.87 The thematic overlap of what Wyndham Lewis 
attacks and what Connolly is today offering is very striking. Lewis himself is drawing 
on earlier critics of Bergson’s philosophy, especially Julien Benda.88 The broad lesson 
here is that the worldview expounded by Bergson is not so new in political theory that it 
does not already have some major critics who should be faced by those carrying these 
ideas forward. Of course Connolly also draws on many more recent writers and, as we 
                                                 
85 Respectively: World, p. 144; pp. 11, 145; p. 144; Fragility, pp. 38–39; 
World, p. 145; p. 146; p. 26; Fragility, p. 167; World, pp. 15–16. 
86 The term “macropolitical” is Connolly’s own: Ethos, p. xxvi. 
87 For a neat explanation of the role of James in Connolly’s “deep pluralist” 
project, see Chambers and Carver, eds, pp. 85–104. 
88 Geoffrey Wagner, Wyndham Lewis: A Portrait of the Artist as the Enemy 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 9. 
have seen, on recent science. But although I have had to “update” Lewis’s criticisms of 
what he (like Deleuze89) calls “Bergsonism” so that they might fairly be applied to 
Connolly’s work, nevertheless I owe it to the reader to acknowledge the historical 
foundations of what I am saying here. 
Now, it seems to me that one of Lewis’s observations in particular illuminates a 
fundamental problem with those writings of Connolly’s in which the “world of 
becoming” thesis is illustrated. Here Lewis uses the term “flux,” which was commoner 
among early commentators on Bergson than it is now – though Connolly himself uses it 
occasionally.90 (Elsewhere Lewis uses the term “becoming,” which today is usually 
preferred.) He writes: 
 
So, to start with, it is probably as well to point out that no Western 
philosopher who has ever lived has denied that there is a constant 
empirical flux and change in time, at least in appearance. Plato, in this 
respect, gives exactly the same account of things as Heraclitus. It is not 
there that the capital antithesis in traditional philosophy is to be sought. 
The radical difference between one kind of doctrine and another has 
consisted in whether it was held that there was anything besides, behind, 
or over and above the Flux, or whether, on the other hand, there was 
                                                 
89 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991). 
90 See World, pp. 44, 105. 
nothing but that.91 
 
What Lewis says here brings certain of Connolly’s shortcomings into focus. 
First, the greater part of each of Connolly’s recent books is devoted to building up the 
very view that Lewis thinks no-one really denies: that there is a constant empirical 
process of change, or “becoming,” in the world – to which end Connolly collects not 
only examples from physical science, but also from thematically-complementary 
theology and film.92 The conclusion can validly be drawn from the science Connolly 
cites that many of the world’s natural and human systems affect each other, appear to be 
connected, and many appear to organize themselves in some way. It is not clear, 
however, that this has ever been in doubt either. Today it is common knowledge that the 
effects of human activity on the world’s natural systems are far-reaching and complex, 
and that predictions have their limitations and margins of error. So what Connolly says 
is a “creative leap”93 of worldview, affirmable only by embracing a “philosophy of 
becoming,”94 is in fact a leap through an open door. 
Second, although Lewis is talking about “Western philosophers” generally, his 
observation seems especially true of political theorists. It is very difficult to identify a 
political philosopher who has denied that the physical and human worlds are in a state 
of “becoming” (or motion), that individuals and groups change, that they are affected 
                                                 
91 Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man [1927] (Santa Rosa: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1993), pp. 232–233. 
92 See World, pp. 68–92. 
93 World, p. 13. 
94 Fragility, p. 29. 
by things (and many different sorts of things) inside and outside of themselves, that 
they change their minds, and their behaviour is often unpredictable, etc. It seems that 
Connolly is caricaturing “traditional” political theory when he implies that it denies any 
of this. In fact the attempt to deal with change in some sense, and with people being 
affected by outside forces, inner “passions” etc., would seem to be evident in every 
political thinker in every tradition. And yet, of course, many political theorists who 
have “affirmed” a world in which such phenomena are acknowledged have drawn very 
different political conclusions from Connolly about agency, responsibility, and 
freedom. Hobbes, for whom also the workings of the mind are but matter in motion, and 
humans greatly affected by outside pressures,95 is but one obvious example.96 So 
Connolly’s conclusions concerning agency etc. can by no means be assumed to follow 
necessarily from accepting the world of becoming and affect that he describes. 
Connolly’s conclusion however goes further, because (thirdly) he seems to think 
his selected scientists are all the time confirming that there is nothing but becoming in 
the world. This pertains to what Wyndham Lewis thinks is “the real question”: whether 
anything is exempt from becoming. This should be Connolly’s focus, because he wants 
to show that the individual and his/her reason, will, and responsibility cannot 
legitimately be posited “above” becoming and/or separate from affect. But Connolly 
                                                 
95 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill [1651] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
9–15. 
96 From this same premise Hobbes concludes that while the individual 
“person” is concrete and natural, groups are artificial – the same position that Connolly 
criticizes George Kateb for holding: see Secularist, p. 139. 
deals with that question relatively sporadically, because he thinks the examples drawn 
from “large scale” complexity science show that becoming is a sort of universal pattern. 
For him, the same scientific advances that show systems to be uncertain, open, and 
deeply plural have also falsified the traditional image of the individual agent, replete 
with individual will and reason, and “responsible” for what it says and does. It is highly 
questionable however that examples of natural self-organization and emergent 
phenomena drawn from oceanography (for example) tell us anything about human 
agency and reason other than by already assuming that they are analogous 
manifestations of a pattern from which nothing is exempt. 
The science that might more legitimately support Connolly’s deep pluralization 
of agency and thought are those that investigate brain processes. His use of 
neuroscience however, focused mostly but not exclusively in Neuropolitics, introduces 
more problems. Ruth Leys has already highlighted the tendency of the “new affect 
theorists” (among whom she includes Connolly97) to “impose” interpretations on the 
findings of scientists.98 These “Deleuze-inspired affect theorists,”99 Leys writes, are 
“gripped by the notion that most philosophers … have overvalued the role of reason and 
rationality in politics”100; they “seek to recast biology in dynamic, energistic, 
nondeterministic terms that emphasize its unpredictable and potentially emancipatory 
qualities”101; “What fundamentally binds together the new affect theorists and the 
                                                 
97 See Leys, “Affect,” p. 469. 
98 Leys, “Affect,” p. 450. 
99 Leys, “Affect,” p. 443. 
100 Leys, “Affect,” p. 436. 
101 Leys, “Affect,” p. 458. 
neuroscientists,” she observes, “is their shared anti-intentionalism.”102 Leys focuses on 
what she argues are the misleading selections and interpretations of science in the work 
of Brian Massumi. Let us see whether Connolly’s recent work evinces the same 
impairment. 
 
Connolly’s “conversations” with science 
Connolly’s use of the physical sciences (including neuroscience) fails to demonstrate 
that the “traditional” image of the individual agent has indeed been falsified, and for 
two reasons. First, his principle of selection is itself unscientific, and very often takes 
the reader away from the scientific mainstream (though by no means always). Connolly 
seems to recognize that he does this, but does not recognize it as a failing: his task is “to 
draw selective sustenance.”103 Elsewhere he admits that, although “There are, of course, 
neuroscientists who advance a more closed reading as they pursue an autonomous 
science,” he is only interested “in those who seek productive interfaces with cultural 
theory in which each makes a contribution to the other.”104 The problem is that it is 
Connolly himself who determines what is a “productive interface” and what counts as a 
“contribution,” and he discusses only that work that supports anti-intentionalism – or 
that seems on his account to support it. He does not address counter-evidence or 
exceptions to the discoveries he cites. Although he mentions for example the “many 
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scientists, philosophers, theorists, and citizens” who do not share “the conception of 
time in which my question is posed” (that is, the conception “time as becoming”105), but 
adopt instead “a punctual, linear conception of secular time most at home with itself in 
conjunction with an observational image of inquiry,”106 he does not say who these 
scientists are, or explain their relationship to the mainstream scientific community, or 
deal with the object, rigour, and conclusions of their science. Neither does he explain 
what inquiry should be based upon if not observation. His judgement also seems to be 
discounting a great deal of what would be recognized as credible to mainstream 
scientists. He draws heavily, for instance, on Stuart Kauffman, whose writings on 
science argue that there is empirical evidence for the existence of God107; he also cites 
the neuroscientist Francisco Varela, who argues that science can gain “insights” from 
Buddhist practices108; but only occasionally admits that he is only dealing with “some 
strains” of science,109 or a “minority movement.”110 
Second, Connolly takes too many liberties with his interpretations of natural 
science, and consequently his “evidence” typically appears more favourable to his 
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political arguments than it really is.111 Ruth Leys has already exposed the “new affect 
theorists’” misleading interpretation of experiments showing a “half-second delay” in 
reflex systems112 – of which Connolly also makes heavy use113 – so I will not repeat her 
work. But again, Connolly is open about the liberties he takes. He talks of putting 
neuroscience and cultural theory “into conversation,”114 “folding” one idea into 
another,115 of neuroscientists and cultural theorists “encountering” each other,116 and 
admits that to do so is “to draw these findings into a perspective that is not entirely that 
of the neuroscientists themselves.”117 “Again,” he says later, “these views contain 
considerable extrapolation and speculation.”118 But Connolly does not seem to 
recognize this as a weakness: “Speculation,” he says, “is unavoidable in these domains 
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today.”119 Indeed he seems to think that “augmenting” science120 with concepts 
imported from thinkers in other fields, such as Nietzsche, Deleuze, and William James, 
is a strength of his work: “The new neuroscience,” he claims, “need[s] augmentation 
from cultural theory.”121 
Let us assess the validity and value of this “augmentation” by comparing the 
words of Connolly’s selected scientists with the “evidence” he claims they provide for 
his political claims. Corresponding with Connolly’s two related arguments already 
outlined – that non-humans have more agency than traditionally thought, and that 
humans have less or more limited agency than traditionally thought – are the two types 
of study Connolly involves in his argument. The first are those that deal with non-
human agency and, on Connolly’s reading, reveal and verify it. These are discussed and 
elaborated especially in A World of Becoming and The Fragility of Things. The second 
are those that deal with human agency and, on Connolly’s reading, falsify the traditional 
account of it. Neuropolitics focuses on this more internal side of the “agency” argument. 
Connolly’s use of Bonnie Bassler’s TED Talk on quorum sensing in bacteria122 
is typical of how he has recently been reporting the discovery and verification of 
“agency” among non-human entities. Bassler investigates how bacterial cells react to 
the presence of other bacteria and, in order to explain what bacteria do in plain 
language, she describes bacteria playing “roles” in our lives, not being “passive,” 
“recognizing,” “talk[ing] with a chemical language,” “talking with chemical words,” 
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etc. Connolly concludes, from Bassler’s explanation, that “bacteria exhibit a degree of 
collective agency”; he calls the bacterium a “proto-agent” and a “dark precursor to 
human agency,” and adds that we should appreciate the “connections” between human 
agency and microbiological processes of this sort.123 But for all the anthropomorphic 
language Bassler uses, she does not mention “agency” once. Indeed, she describes very 
clearly, and in fascinating detail, the “mechanism” underlying the biochemical reactions 
she is talking about. This “mechanism” is ignored by Connolly, perhaps because it fits 
uneasily with the idea of bacteria as “agents” and with Connolly’s preferred model of 
emergent causality. It also points to the scientific achievements of prediction and 
control which in fact underpin the possible future use of new knowledge about bacteria 
for medicine, which Bassler also discusses, but Connolly prefers to ignore. 
Connolly’s readings in neuroscience, as I have said, would seem to be more 
promising for his arguments about human thought and action. In Neuropolitics he cites 
the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who studies how a person’s sensory, 
motor, and emotional memories seem to be related to their “dispositions” and to the 
decisions they make. According to Connolly, Damasio “seconds many of the things 
Bergson says” – though he also admits that Damasio “seems unaware of how closely his 
account tracks Bergson’s theory.”124 In one of Damasio’s studies, a patient with brain 
damage was unable to make quick decisions, which is thought to be due to his loss of 
“somatic markers” which, in turn, are thought to highlight “options.”125 Quickly, 
however, Connolly is concluding that “rational choice theory and the reduction of 
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culture to an unlayered set of intersubjective concepts and beliefs are thrown into 
jeopardy” by this study126; “The model of ‘deliberative democracy,’ loved by many 
political theorists, requires modification too,” he adds.127 Actually Damasio’s work says 
nothing about rational choice theory, or indeed about “rationality” at all – that is, about 
whether people are, can be, or should be rational. He says nothing about the meaning of 
“culture,” and nothing about what the “deliberative” part of “deliberative democracy” 
assumes. Neither has he any use for the noun “affect” or, importantly, for the concept of 
agency. In fact, from none of what Connolly quotes Damasio saying does the 
neuroscientist appear to think that his work investigates agency at all. 
Connolly also cites the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux, who studies the 
functioning of the amygdala and who, according to Connolly, “confirm[s] the 
indispensibility of affect to thinking.”128 LeDoux explains that “When the amygdala 
detects danger … the result is the release of a hormone called ACTH … [which] flows 
through the blood into the brain, where it binds to the receptors in the hippocampus, 
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and other regions”; it does this “sub-symbolically, in codes 
that are not decipherable consciously.”129 But Connolly’s gloss adds something: “Thus 
the amygdala, an intense little brain nodule … participates in a system that generates 
rapid, coarse judgments in dangerous situations operating below the capacity of 
conscious assessment and feeling.”130 The element Connolly has introduced himself is 
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the generation of judgments without conscious assessment of the “situation,” which is 
supposedly cut off “above” the process described by LeDoux. But LeDoux says nothing 
about this process incapacitating, limiting, or replacing conscious assessment of a 
situation; he merely says that the subject is not aware of exactly what is happening in 
his brain. And again, like Damasio, LeDoux does not discuss “affect” at all, or indeed 
agency. LeDoux is also cited in Why I Am Not a Secularist, where Connolly makes 
heavy use of the “visceral register” of thought, which is, he tells us, “linked by multiple 
circuits” to the “more refined intellectual register.”131 Again he cites Joseph LeDoux’s 
work on the amygdala.132 But nowhere in his research does LeDoux claim that there are 
different “registers” of thought. Connolly actually takes his idea of “registers” from the 
other side of the “conversation” he is hosting, namely from Nietzsche and mediaeval 
Christian thought.133 
These “conversations” that Connolly is staging, then, are changing the 
conclusions of his scientists by introducing words and concepts that they have not 
themselves used – above all, agency. It is not however obvious that agency normally is, 
or should be, understood in the first place as an entity susceptible of natural-scientific 
falsification. Words pertaining to agency in philosophy, such as the “will,” the “self,” 
the “subject,” the “ego,” “responsibility” etc., may be deployed to make sense of 
something given to individual and social experience in some way – phenomenologically 
or existentially, perhaps. But it does not follow that they are to be understood as bodies, 
structures, or forces that are empirically verifiable or falsifiable. I am not arguing that 
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such things should not be referred to, or that they are, as Ayer says, “senseless.”134 
Other readers might wish to assess what sort of function these terms have, and on what 
other grounds they have been legitimately used and might continue to be. Here I intend 
only to point out that an individual’s “agency,” “will,” and/or “reason” is not something 
of which Connolly’s neuroscientists have proved or disproved the existence or function, 
or probably even tried to; and that by introducing the agency and reasoning of the 
individual into these scientists’ findings from the other side of this “conversation” with 
cultural theory, Connolly is actually imposing (as Ruth Leys says) upon neuroscience 
entities and processes that it does not analyse, and perhaps cannot analyse, in order to 
proclaim that they are fictitious and must be “rethought.” The “evidence” Connolly 
presents to support the primary prescription of “deep pluralism” is, then, essentially of 
his own making, which is why it is not surprising that it seems to “resonate” with the 
philosophers he follows.135 
 
“Creative freedom” 
As Connolly has turned in recent work to the complexity and “agency” of non-human 
systems, he has begun to discuss the implications of redistributive agency for the 
political concept of freedom.136 Connolly rejects “negative” and “positive” freedom 
because neither, he says, “comes to terms sufficiently with the role of creativity in 
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freedom.”137 By this Connolly means the role of affect within and without the 
individual, that is, other elements or “forces” entering into processes of desiring, 
pursuing, planning, and acting. For Connolly, “negative” and “positive” theories of 
freedom cannot accommodate complexity and affect, so in their stead he offers what he 
calls “creative freedom.”138 Creative freedom ostensibly corresponds better with the 
new “complex” account of the individual and world by including forces “below” and 
“above” the individual. Here is how Connolly illustrates it: 
 
Creative processes flow through and over us, and reflexivity doubles the 
creative adventure. Actions are thus not entirely controlled by preexisting 
intentions; rather the creative dimension helps to compose and refine 
intentions as they become consolidated in action. To articulate the creative 
dimension of freedom, then, is to insert a fundamental qualification or 
hesitation into the ideas of both the masterful agent and agency as the 
activation of intentions already there. The creative element is located 
somewhere between active and passive agency. When creative freedom is 
under way in an unsettled context we may find ourselves allowing or 
encouraging a new thought, desire, or strategy to crystallize out of the 
confusion and nest of proto-thoughts that precede it. An agent, individual 
or collective, can help to open the portals of creativity, but it cannot will 
that which is creative to come into being by intending the result before it 
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arrives. Real creativity is thus tinged with uncertainty and mystery.139 
 
Connolly’s examples concern, first, a basketball player spontaneously creating a new 
type of shot while “under intense defensive pressure”; the shot catches on and 
revolutionizes the world of basketball. For Connolly, “Such modes of creative, mutual 
adjustment, neither simply assignable to one player or coach, nor fitting neatly into 
extant notions of preformed intention … occur all the time in multiple domains. They 
form part of the essence of freedom.”140 He then adds examples of “creative 
innovations” in politics, such as boycotts, anti-slavery networks, and protests.141 But 
what else can we say about “the essence of freedom”? Connolly later adds: “The 
spontaneity now flows through the agents and the open-ended rules of the practice, for 
good or ill.”142 He also talks of people being “a vehicle through which something new 
and noble is brought into the world,”143 “catalyzing events,”144 and helping to “usher 
something new into the world.”145 And later, “Freedom: to be and to become otherwise 
than we are.”146 
                                                 
139 Fragility, p. 75; for a note on the “Nietzschean” origin of this side of 
Connolly’s recent work see p.174; and also Dumm, “Connolly’s Voice,” p. 77. 
140 Fragility, p. 75. 
141 Fragility, pp. 77–78. 
142 Fragility, p. 76. 
143 World, p. 75. 
144 Fragility, p. 145. 
145 World, p. 75; see also p. 27. 
146 Fragility, p. 79. 
There are lots of ideas here, and Connolly may of course intend to develop his 
account of “creative freedom” in more detail in future work, so a consciously 
provisional summary is appropriate. As Connolly has explained it so far, “creative 
freedom” seems to be (1) an inherently collective phenomenon, (2) realized (even) in 
the absence of intentions, (3) enjoyed when forces act through the individual, or use the 
individual as a “vehicle,” and seems (4) to require the emergence of something “new.” 
Despite the provisional nature of “creative freedom,” some undelayed 
assessment is deserved: firstly because Connolly is already linking the freedom of “real 
creativity”147 with such political activism as he considers to be urgent148; and secondly 
because what he says about “creative freedom” throws light on the true failure of his 
attack on individual agency and reason in political theory, and perhaps also in activism. 
In order to assess Connolly’s theory of “creative freedom” there are three 
questions that should be posed. First, what does the individual stand to lose and gain by 
freedom of this kind that he/she is currently denied? Second, what does the collective 
stand to lose or gain by it? And third, can it count as a theory of freedom at all? – that 
is, does it satisfy certain criteria that a theory of freedom as such should satisfy? 
For the individual there are firstly, Connolly says, “rewards attached to 
embracing the world as becoming. The vitality of life is experienced actively”149; the 
affirmation “enhances our positive sense of attachment to [the] cosmos”150; we are 
opened “to modes of experience, feeling and proto-agency in the world that most of us 
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had heretofore missed … new thresholds of human sensitivity are also tapped”151; “a 
sense of attunement is attained”152; we can “allow the sweetness of existence to sink 
into our pores”153 and “feel tremors of gratitude for existence itself.”154 These 
“rewards” seem to apply to what Connolly calls “the visceral register” (feelings), and in 
the cases of many individuals what he describes would be true: people do indeed 
commonly report that being part of something, such as a “good cause,” makes them feel 
alive and that they have a place in the world and a part to play; it makes them feel “in 
tune,” “at peace,” “harmonized,” and (put simply) happy. All of this might certainly be 
part of what it means to “feel free.” Connolly’s creative freedom may, then, retain the 
freedom felt by being part of collective action. 
For the individual secondly, creative freedom offers freedom from responsibility 
in certain of its burdensome manifestations.155 As the Stoics recognized, softening one’s 
resistance to one’s surroundings – to forces physical, social, ideological – would seem 
to be less arduous than maintaining or even escalating resistance to them. But what 
Connolly has in mind is that, thinking, speaking, and acting as part of something larger 
and/or more complex, individuals are less exposed to attack, blame, and condemnation 
for the words and actions for which they would previously, “traditionally,” have been 
expected to accept full responsibility, sometimes perhaps unfairly.156 
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But by the same move, the individual also stands to lose quite a lot in 
Connolly’s new philosophy. For Connolly, individual responsibility is falsified when 
individual agents “are themselves composed of several micro-agents”157; when the will 
is “divided against itself”158; when “The “you” refers to intra-individual, micro- and 
macro-assemblages of desire”159; when I (like you) “become plural.”160 Connolly does 
not intend, I think, to cancel all responsibility for the individual; the individual is still 
supposed to be a “force” in the complex.161 But this account of what makes up an 
individual surely applies all the time. By being evasive on the question of what is not 
taken away from individual responsibility162 and/or when – by saying that the agency 
and responsibility of the individual is to “give considerable ground,”163 to be 
“loosened,”164 and “redistributed,” without anywhere explicating what is to be left 
intact – nothing concrete seems to have been guaranteed for the individual, or of the 
individual. I mean to indicate two distinct but related “losses” by this. First, as everyone 
and everything is “affected” in some way at all times, it seems that there can be no 
                                                 
157 World, p. 27. 
158 World, pp. 22, 82. 
159 World, p. 123; see also p. 97. 
160 “Becoming Plural” was the title of a 2007 conference on Connolly’s 
political thought hosted by the Department of Politics and International Relations at 
Swansea University, UK. See Political Theory 35, 2 (April 2007), 239. 
161 See Fragility, p. 135. 
162 See World, pp. 21–22, 25. 
163 Fragility, p. 145. 
164 World, p. 29. 
situations in which individual responsibility must still be accepted. Certainly Connolly 
does not suggest any. But just as individuals can never be held solely responsible for 
their mistakes, so their achievements can never be their “own,” they can never 
“deserve” anything. That is the first loss. 
The second concerns the right to think of oneself not only as an “independent” 
thinker or actor, but also as “the same person.” Connolly’s politics of complexity insists 
on the plurality of a person, on the ever-new composition of the “assemblage,” and on 
the constant interruption this offers to narratives of fixed identity. Because of the binary 
categories into which he forces everything – single and fixed (false and resentful), or 
plural and becoming (true and affirmatory) – Connolly has nothing to say about the 
continuity of an individual’s identity through or in becoming. Connolly’s politics of 
complexity, then, by attacking the permanence and ignoring the continuity of a person’s 
identity, seems to entail the loss of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “the unity of a human 
life.”165 Wyndham Lewis, writing in the 1920s, and noting the effect of this quirk of 
“Bergsonism” generally for the individual, describes what is left: 
 
What you pay for the pantheistic immanent oneness of “creative,” 
“evolutionary” substance, into which you are invited to merge, is that you 
become a phalanstery of selves. The old objection to any pantheism, that it 
banishes individuality and is not good for the self, comes out more 
strongly than ever in the teaching of “space-time.” So … it becomes more 
and more evident that, although it is by no means clear that you gain 
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anything (except a great many fine phrases and exalted, mystical 
assurances of “cosmic” advantages), it is very clear what you lose.166 
 
 This brings us to the social cost of Connolly’s politics of complexity. We have 
seen that “creative freedom” involves the kind of freedom that individuals might feel 
when they have successfully redistributed blame for their thoughts, words, and 
movements – whether that responsibility has been passed on to their biology, their 
socio-political context, or to other people.167 It might however be argued that this is not 
a good thing; that trust and peaceful social relations rely on individuals’ narrative unity 
and upon people being discouraged from denying responsibility whenever it might suit 
them. For Lewis, again, “Constantly encouraged to regard himself as a mass of Hydes 
and Jekylls,” an individual “throws all his useful obligations to the winds”; and these 
obligations, he adds, are “useful  to each and all of us, for it is upon the ‘behaviourism’ 
inbred in our neighbour, of moral and unselfish precept, that our personal comfort and 
peace depend.”168 So if the individual’s inherent plurality is allowed to affect the 
concept of responsibility itself, as Connolly has long thought it must,169 then what 
seems at risk is any obligation “I” have to honour obligations that “I” acquired at some 
past time, whether by promises made or by advantages previously received, when I was 
a different assemblage. Connolly envisages his activists adopting a general attitude of 
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disobedience.170 But it is certain obligations that we put on one another – holding each 
other to account by ascribing what Hannah Arendt calls the ability of individuals to 
make and keep promises – that the peace and comfort of all of us depends, as Lewis 
points out, including that of the most disadvantaged among us. Connolly’s “creative 
freedom,” and the “becoming plural” that attends it, seems to return us to the very 
situation that Hobbes recognizes as the condition which must be overcome for social 
life to exist at all: the condition in which the plurality of sovereign selves makes trust 
impossible.171 The exact nature of the problem is of course different, but the solution 
can be summarized in the same way: The “many” must in some sense be made and 
maintained as a “one”; the deliquescence of this “one” cannot serve as a platform for 
the solution of social and political problems. Connolly’s deep pluralization of the 
individual seems to be a solvent, rather than a coagulator; a catalyst for the dissolution 
of the social fabric, unpromising for the reassembly of it. 
Finally I have doubts that “creative freedom” as Connolly has hitherto explained 
it can even function as a basic theory of freedom at all. Campaigning for creative 
freedom would not seem be about winning rights or opportunities for people to do or 
say things that were previously forbidden or unobtainable for them. Neither does it 
seem to be a kind of freedom that a government could be upbraided for repressing. 
Certainly it does not seem to be the kind of freedom that “militant” political activism is 
ordinarily intended to secure. These are perhaps mundane criteria for an account of 
freedom, but it seems essential that we could at least identify from a theory of freedom 
when, where, and how that freedom were being withheld. With Connolly’s creative 
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freedom we cannot do this. If individuals inhabit biologically- and culturally-complex 
bodies, and are inextricably involved in collective processes which affect them, which 
are affected by them, and which happen through them to the realization of something 
“new,” then they are “creatively free” already, on Connolly’s account of freedom. That 
process is, for him, the pattern of the universe. “Freedom,” then, is conceptually 
superfluous. 
But worse, because creative freedom actually applies everywhere all the time, 
Connolly accidentally offers a vocabulary for describing any (political) activity as 
“free” and “creative.” This might apply to the sorts of movements Connolly calls 
“noble,” of course, but it would be equally serviceable to the kind of organizations, 
regimes, and movements that Connolly might want to say compromise or impede 
freedom: morally ambiguous, exploitative, resource-depleting corporations, for 
example, or supremacist groups of various kinds – all of which, consistent with the 
biological imagery Connolly favours, organize, sustain, and reproduce themselves, 
evolve by adapting to their environments, affect and are in turn affected by self-
organizing systems above and below the levels of their own operation, generate 
unpredictable novelties, often without or despite intentions, and rely on members 
allowing forces to “flow through” them. On Connolly’s account, people involved in 
such activities could rightfully claim to be “free” and to have “freedom” on their side. 
 
The intellect 
So far we have been assessing Connolly’s problematization of individual agency. But 
there is also good reason to be cautious about his correlative attempt to problematize 
“deliberation.” Connolly wants to highlight “the insufficiency of what might be called 
intellectualist and deliberationist ‘models’ of thinking that retain so much credibility in 
philosophy and the human sciences.”172 “Today many cultural and political theorists act 
as if ethics and politics do, could, or should consist of deliberation alone,” he says.173 
Connolly associates such models of “deliberation” particularly with Kant, and therefore 
with “transcendence,”174 which he understands as the error of positing an “outside 
view,” a perspective transcending the cut and thrust of real processes of becoming.175 
Connolly, calling his position “immanent naturalism,”176 argues that there is in fact no 
such outside perspective: various sources of affect are always interrupting or disturbing 
intellectual processes,177 applying “pressures” to them,178 often subliminally, or from 
“below” consciousness179; or faster than consciousness180; or, the things we try to 
conceptualize “elude” or “exceed” consciousness.181 It is clear, then, that Connolly is 
not really attacking intellectualism – the idea that only deliberation counts – but the 
validity of unaffected thinking as such. 
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The question we are all the time dealing with, the reader may recall, is not 
whether we live in a world of becoming, but whether it can be held that there is 
anything “besides, behind, or over and above the flux” (Lewis’s phrasing) – or, as I 
have said, anything exempt from becoming. Something which might still be considered 
exempt or different in some important sense from the world of becoming is what these 
“intellectual” processes that Connolly targets – knowledge, self-awareness, and 
mastery182 – have in common: namely, reasoning. 
Reasoning is of course itself a process, so it “becomes” in a very obvious sense, 
but not in such a way that it is falsified by the processes Connolly describes. By 
“reasoning” or (following Connolly) “deliberation” I intend nothing more 
“transcendent” than what is so neatly described by R. G. Collingwood: “thinking one 
thing, x, because you think another thing, y; where y is your ‘reason’ or, as it is 
sometimes called, your ‘ground’ for thinking x.”183 We reason in this sense when we are 
trying to decide and/or plan things.184 Connolly thinks “traditional” images of reasoning 
presuppose either (1) that neurological processes are “insulated” from other processes, 
or (2) the existence of a “transcendent plane,” removed from the physical world, upon 
which reasoning happens.185 But it is not obvious that either assumption is invoked by 
the basic account of reasoning just given. Indeed even the most stubborn rationalist can 
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agree that people’s judgements often prove infuriatingly susceptible to all sorts of 
irrational “forces,” and that neurodegenerative diseases impair sufferers’ ability to 
reason well. But Connolly gives no reason not to add to that agreement what the 
rationalist would always want to add: namely, that there is nevertheless a difference 
between a good reason for thinking x, and a pressure to conclude x; and that intellectual 
processes can and should distinguish reasons from pressures. Someone who asserts x 
justifies it by explaining their reasoning, after all, not the complex brain processes in 
them of which the conclusion was an emergent novelty.186 We talk about someone’s 
reasoning “going wrong” because of such pressures, or being led astray, or even being 
corrupted. So it is possible to acknowledge the processes of the physical world, 
including within the brain, but also to think that existing accounts of intellectual 
processes remain unaffected, without making either of the assumptions Connolly 
targets. 
Finally, there is a considerable irony to Connolly’s problematization of reason, 
for he continues (very often while carrying out that project) to promote, as in Capitalism 
and Christianity, American Style, carefully thought-through policies on commuting and 
travel, health care, food supply and diet, power and waste, green efficiency, education, 
and even mortgages.187 Similarly, what he calls “critical responsiveness” – subtly 
“moving” the relations that comprise a given identity in order to prevent it from being 
settled in a certain way188 – would seem to rely on careful analysis of a situation and a 
well-planned response. Whether the reader considers such political thinking to be 
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theorizing, policy-forming, or both, it seems to involve the very intellectual processes 
Connolly is calling into question. The process he thinks should replace the now-refuted 
intellect also seems no different from what he elsewhere attacks as the resentful force of 
“teleological finalism”189 – the force that allegedly drives the attempts of political élites 
to organize people.190 Here is how Connolly describes his supposedly affirmative 
alternative: “You first try to imagine an interim future in which substantial progress has 
been made on both fronts within capitalism, broadly defined … You then work back 
from that point to specific reforms that could actualize the image.”191 The usual name 
for that intellectual process is “planning”: good planning where sound reasoning and 
predictions are involved, poor planning where they are not. 
It seems to me that Connolly’s attempt to denigrate the intellect is not only 
poorly evidenced but also to be regretted, and that political theorists – as thinkers 
themselves and presumably as advocates of clear thinking where possible – ought to be 
alert to this side of his recent writings. On the level of the populace, Connolly is 
implying (again, always choosing his words carefully) that humans can and should self-
organize almost instinctively, without “intellectual” forces repressing their immanent 
natural processes.192 But how about on the level of environmental politics? Connolly is 
certainly concerned about man’s relationship with the natural environment, and heavily 
critical of past and continuing (mis)management of natural resources and ecosystems. 
But on this level Connolly’s attack on the intellect would appear to exacerbate the 
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problem. Abandoning intellectual knowledge, individual responsibility, and the desire to 
control where the environment is concerned would seem to entail treating with 
suspicion, or even abandoning, our attempts to understand how the natural world works 
and how human activity affects it; it appears to entail passing on (some) responsibility 
for one’s own actions and behaviours, both as individual consumers and as shareholders 
in advanced economies; and it seems to entail giving up on solving environmental 
problems in a spirit of trying to control things. Ostensibly intended to fuel 
environmentalism, Connolly’s advice actually fits very uneasily with some of the basic 
assumptions of the majority of environmental scientists and campaigners, namely (1) 
that we are better off knowing more and not less about how human activity affects the 
natural environment; (2) that we need individuals to take responsibility; and (3) that we 
should act in order to effect desired results, rather than wait for other parties to move 
first or, worse, for ecosystems to right themselves. Again then, it is clear what is to be 
lost in Connolly’s programme, but much less clear what is to be gained. 
 
Conclusions 
According to William E. Connolly, advocates of the politics of becoming are a 
“growing contingent.”193 If this is true, it can largely be attributed to the apparent 
resonance of the politics of becoming with both new science and radical activist 
political theory. Connolly claims ample support for his metaphysical rejection of 
individual agency and thinking from the cutting edge of physical science, which he 
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thinks is increasingly confirming the old speculations of Bergson, William James, and 
Nietzsche. But in fact what he presents is not the scientific evidence that he says it is. 
His selections are unreliable and unrepresentative, and his interpretations are 
unwarranted and unscientific. The “conversations” into which he places the scientists he 
uses, which ostensibly fill lacunae with insights from other perspectives, in fact 
misrepresent their conclusions, mostly by introducing entities that they were never 
dealing with in the first place, and probably would not attempt to. 
The implications of Connolly’s attack on the agency and reasoning of the 
individual are also a little worrying, not least those pertaining to freedom. His 
reworking of freedom, “creative freedom,” promises positive feelings, but concretely 
offers nothing that people cannot already enjoy other than some unspecified degree of 
liberation from being blamed. What “creative freedom” denies the individual outweighs 
these anyway questionable benefits: the right to deserve credit for individual 
achievements, and the narrative unity of a human life in and through its development. 
The social impact of “creative freedom” is also troubling. The pluralization of the 
individual seems to undermine obligations in general, with incalculable consequences 
for any collective. “Creative freedom” also fails a basic test for any theory of freedom: 
it makes a nonsense of liberation because, in its chief features, “creative freedom” 
describes the same process that is on Connolly’s account going on everywhere anyway. 
But worse, because nothing seems to be excluded by “creative freedom,” it might be 
deployed to legitimate and celebrate processes and regimes which could not so easily be 
reconciled to other, more discriminating accounts of freedom. 
Finally, Connolly seems to be making his considerable academic weight 
serviceable to a cause hostile not (only) to intellectualism, but to the intellect itself in its 
most essential function: the distinguishing of good reasons from bad reasons and from 
unconscious processes or “pressures.” The practical effect of Connolly’s anti-
deliberation programme for global politics would actually be detrimental to any human 
activity that depended on the responsibility and obligations of the individual, including 
any activity that might have sought to repair damage done to ecosystems. If William E. 
Connolly, apparently the fourth most influential scholar in political theory in the last 
twenty years, is right about this “growing contingent,” then we cannot any longer afford 
to neglect these and other fundamental weaknesses of “the politics of complexity.” 
